Abstract. Differential Power Analysis, first introduced by Kocher et al. in [14], is a powerful technique allowing to recover secret smart card information by monitoring power signals. In [14] a specific DPA attack against smart-cards running the DES algorithm was described. As few as 1000 encryptions were sufficient to recover the secret key. In this paper we generalize DPA attack to elliptic curve (EC) cryptosystems and describe a DPA on EC Diffie-Hellman key exchange and EC El-Gamal type encryption. Those attacks enable to recover the private key stored inside the smart-card. Moreover, we suggest countermeasures that thwart our attack.
Introduction
The use of elliptic curve in cryptography was first proposed by Miller [17] and Koblitz [12] in 1985. Since that time, a lot of attention has been paid to elliptic curves for cryptographic applications and it has become increasingly common to implement public-key protocols on elliptic curves over large finite field. Elliptic curves (EC) provide a group structure, which can be used to translate existing discrete-logarithm cryptosystems into the context of EC. The discrete logarithm problem in a cyclic group G of order n with generator g refers to the problem of finding x given some element y = g x of G. The discrete logarithm problem over an EC seems to be much harder than in other groups such as the multiplicative group of a finite field. No subexponential-time algorithm is known for the discrete logarithm problem in the class of non-supersingular EC. Consequently, keys can be much smaller in the EC context, typically about 160 bits.
In this paper we consider attacks based on the monitoring of power consumption of smart-card EC implementation. Differential Power Analysis, first described by Kocher et al. in [14] , is a powerful technique that exploit the leakage of information related to power consumption. The attack was successfully applied to a DES implementation; as few as 1000 encryptions were sufficient to recover the secret key [14] . More recently, the resistance of smart-card implementations of the AES candidates against monitoring power consumption was considered in [1, 3, 5] . The conclusion was that straightforward implementations of AES candidates were highly vulnerable to power analysis. In this paper we show that naive implementations of ECC are also highly vulnerable to power analysis.
The paper is organized as follows. After recalling the principle of EC operations in section 2, we describe in section 3 the principle of our power consumption attack. In section 4, we apply the attack to some common discretelogarithm based cryptosystems such as Diffie-Hellman key exchange [7] and ElGamal public-key encryption [8] . Finally we suggest three countermeasures that prevent our attack.
Elliptic Curve Group Operation

Definition of an elliptic curve
An elliptic curve is the set of points (x, y) which are solutions of a bivariate cubic equation over a field K (see [16] ). An equation of the form:
where a i ∈ K, defines an elliptic curve over K. If char K = 2 and char K = 3, equation (1) can be transformed to:
In the field GF(2 n ) of characteristic 2, equation (1) can be reduced to the form:
The set of points on an elliptic curve, together with a special point O called the point at infinity can be equipped with an Abelian group structure by the following addition operation:
Addition formula [16] for char K = 2, 3:
Let P = (x 1 , y 1 ) = O be a point, the inverse of P is −P = (x 1 , −y 1 ). Let Q = (x 2 , y 2 ) = O be a second point with Q = −P , the sum P + Q = (x 3 , y 3 ) can be calculated as:
To subtract the point P = (x, y), one adds the point −P .
Addition formula for char K = 2: Let P = (x 1 , y 1 ) = O be a point, the inverse of P is −P = (x 1 , x 1 + y 1 ). Let Q = (x 2 , y 2 ) = O be a second point with Q = −P , the sum P + Q = (x 3 , y 3 ) can be calculated as:
if P = Q and:
Computing a multiple of a point
The operation of adding a point P to itself d times is called scalar multiplication by d and denoted dP . Scalar multiplication is the basic operation for EC protocols. Scalar multiplication in the group of points of an elliptic curve is the analogous of exponentiation in the multiplicative group of integers modulo a fixed integer m.
Computing dP can be done with the straightforward double-and-add approach based on the binary expansion of d = (d −1 , . . . , d 0 ) where d −1 is the most significant bit of d (the method is the analogous of the square-and-multiply algorithm for exponentiation):
Various techniques exist to speed-up scalar multiplication by reducing the number of elementary point operations: see [9] for a good survey. If the point P is known in advance, it may be advantageous to precompute a table of multiples of P [2] . Because elliptic curve subtraction has the same cost as addition, the previous double-and-add algorithm can be improved with the addition-subtraction algorithm which uses a signed binary expansion of d:
The non-adjacent form (NAF) of d is a signed binary expansion of d with c i c i+1 = 0 for all i ≥ 0. Each positive integer has a unique NAF. Moreover, the NAF of d has the fewest nonzero coefficients of any signed binary expansion of d [9] . [18] describes an algorithm that generates the NAF of any positive integer.
The double-and-add method and addition-subtraction method can be generalized to the m-ary method, the window method and the signed binary window method [9, 15] .
The problem of finding a method to compute dP with the fewest number of elliptic curve group operations for a given d is equivalent to finding the shortest addition-subtraction chain for d [9] . An addition chain [11] for d is a sequence of positive integers:
such that a i = a j + a k , for some k ≤ j < i, for all i = 1, 2, . . . , r.
An addition chain can be extended to an addition-subtraction chain [11] with a i = ±a j ± a k in place of a i = a j + a k . The shortest addition-subtraction chain for d gives the fewest number of elliptic group operations for computing dP by computing a 1 P, a 2 P, . . . a r P = dP .
Recovering d in Q = dP From the Power Consumption
In 1998, Kocher described in a technical draft [14] Simple Power Attacks (SPA) and Differential Power Analysis (DPA) on DES. A SPA consists in observing the power consumption of one single execution of a cryptographic algorithm. A DPA is more sophisticated and powerful. It consists in performing a statistical analysis of many executions of the same algorithm with different inputs.
Here we show that monitoring power consumption during the computation of Q = dP knowing P may enable to recover d. First we show that a naive implementation of scalar multiplication may be vulnerable to SPA. However, it is not difficult to make the implementation resistant against SPA. We then describe a DPA attack of an implementation of scalar multiplication.
Resistance against SPA
Power consumption attacks are based on the observation that the power consumed at a given time during cryptographic process is related to the instruction being executed and the data being manipulated. Power consumption enables to visually identify large features, for example the main loop in algorithm 1. Power consumption analysis may also enable to distinguish between instruction being executed. For example, it might be possible to distinguish between point doubling and point addition in algorithm 1, thereby revealing the bits of the exponent d.
In order to be resistant against SPA, the instructions performed during a cryptographic algorithm should not depend on the data being processed, e.g. there should not be any branch instructions conditioned by the data. It is easy to modify algorithm 1 to achieve this goal:
DPA against double-and-add algorithm
In this section we describe a DPA against an implementation of algorithm 1'. We assume that the algorithm is performed in constant time. Otherwise the implementation may be subject to timing attack [13] and Simple Power Attacks [14] .
DPA on DES [6] algorithm as described in [14] uses correlation between power consumption and specific key-dependent bits which appear at known steps of the encryption computation. For example, a selected bit b at the output of one SBOX of the first round will depend on the known input message and 6 unknown bits of the key. In [14] , the correlation between power consumption and b is computed for the 64 possible values of the 6 unknown bits of the key. The correlation is likely to be maximal for the correct guess of the 6 bits of the key. The attack can be repeated for the remaining SBOXes, thus revealing 48 bits of the key. The remaining 8 bits of the key can be recovered by exhaustive search.
A Differential Power Analysis on algorithm 1' in section 3.1 can be performed by noticing that at step j the processed point Q depends only on the first bits (d −1 , . . . , d j ) of d. Now assume that we know how points are represented in memory during computation and select a particular bit (the same for all points) of this representation. When point Q is processed, power consumption will be correlated to this specific bit of Q. No correlation will be observed with a point not computed inside the card. Thus it is possible to successively recover the bits of the exponent by guessing which points are computed by the card.
The second most significant bit d −2 of d can be recovered by computing the correlation between power consumption and any specific bit of the binary representation of 4P . If d −2 = 0, 4P is computed during algorithm 1', and power consumption is thus correlated with any specific bit of 4P . Otherwise if d −2 = 1, 4P is never computed, and no correlation will be observed with 4P . This gives d −2 . The following bits of d can be recursively recovered in the same way.
Assume that algorithm 1' is performed k times with distinct P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P k to compute Q 1 = dP 1 , Q 2 = dP 2 , . . . , Q k = dP k . Let C i (t) be the power consumption associated with the i-th execution of the algorithm for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Let s i be any specific bit of the binary representation of 4P i for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. The correlation function g(t) between s i and C i (t) can be computed as follows:
Assume that the points 4P i are processed at time t = t 1 , power consumption C i (t 1 ) will then be correlated with the specific bit s i of the binary representation of 4P i . The average of power consumption for those points 4P i for which s i = 1 will be different from the power consumption for the points 4P i for which s i = 0, and function g(t) will present a "peak" at time t = t 1 . If the points 4P i are never computed, no "peak" will be observed in function g(t). This is illustrated in figure  1 and 2. 
Extending the attack to any scalar multiplication algorithm
In this section we show how to extend the previous attack to any scalar multiplication algorithm executed in constant time with a constant addition-subtraction chain, i.e. for any point P the algorithm computes the sequence of point:
such that a i = ±a j ± a k , for some k ≤ j < i, for all i = 1, 2, . . . , r.
The attack consists in successively guessing the a i starting from a 0 = 1 to a r = d. At step i ≥ 1, one constructs the set A i of all possible a i = ±a j ± a k for all 0 ≤ k ≤ j < i, and for each a i ∈ A i computes the correlation function g(t) between the point a i P and power consumption. If a peak can be observed in g(t), this will indicate that the point a i P has been computed by the device and thus a i = a i . This enables to recover d = a r in O(r 2 ) time.
Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange
The EC Diffie-Hellman protocol derives a common secret value z from one party's private key and another party's public key. The protocol is referenced as ECSVDP-DH (Elliptic Curve Secret Value Derivation Primitive, Diffie-Hellman version) in [10] . If the two parties correctly execute this primitive, they will produce the same output.
System parameter: An elliptic curve E over GF (p) or GF (2 n ). The order of E denoted #E must be divisible by a large prime q. Alice's own private key s. Bob's public key W .
Derivation of the shared secret value z:
Compute the point P = sW . If P = O output "error" and stop.
The shared secret value is z = x p , the x-coordinate of P .
The attack described in the previous section recovers Alice's secret key when she computes the point P = sW for Bob's public key W .
Countermeasures Against DPA
In this section we describe three countermeasures that prevent from the attack described in section 3. Recall that the attack enables to recover d when Q i = dP i are computed inside the card for various P i for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. These three countermeasures are based on introducing random numbers during the computation of Q = dP . We underline that other attacks might of course not be thwarted by our countermeasures.
First countermeasure: randomization of the private exponent
Let #E be the number of points of the curve. The computation of Q = dP is done by the following algorithm:
1. Select a random number k of size n bits. In practice, one can take n = 20 bits.
This countermeasure makes the previous attack infeasible since the exponent d in Q = d P changes at each new execution of the algorithm.
Second countermeasure: blinding the point P
The method is analogous to Chaum's blind signature scheme for RSA [4] . The point P to be multiplied is "blinded" by adding a secret random point R for which we know S = dR. Scalar multiplication is done by computing the point d(R + P ) and subtracting S = dR to get Q = dP . The points R and S = dR can be initially stored inside the card and refreshed at each new execution by computing R ← (−1) b 2R and S ← (−1) b 2S, where b is a random bit generated at each new execution. This makes the previous attack infeasible since the point P = P + R to be multiplied by d is not known to the attacker.
Third countermeasure: randomized projective coordinates
Projective coordinates [16] can be used to avoid the costly field inversion for point addition and doubling. The projective coordinates (X, Y, Z) of a point P = (x, y) are given by:
Another system of projective coordinates may be found in [10] . The projective coordinates of a point are not unique because:
(X, Y, Z) = (λX, λY, λZ)
for every λ = 0 in the finite field. The third countermeasure consists in randomizing the projective coordinate representation of a point P = (X, Y, Z). Before each new execution of the scalar multiplication algorithm for computing Q = dP , the projective coordinates of P are randomized according to equation (3) with a random λ. The randomization can also occur after each point addition and doubling. This makes the attack described above infeasible since it is not possible for the attacker to predict any specific bit of the binary representation of P in projective coordinates.
Conclusion
We have shown that unless protected, implementations of elliptic curve cryptosystems such as El-Gamal type encryption or Diffie-Hellman key exchange are vulnerable to Differential Power Analysis. We have introduced three countermeasures that address specifically these attacks. Those countermeasures are easy to implement and do not impact efficiency in a significant way. However, we do not pretend that those countermeasures thwart from all kinds of power attacks, since it may be possible to exploit the information leakage through power consumption in a different way.
